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The purpose of this paper is to follow the development of the Swedish gender earnings gap
through the 1980s and 1990s. We follow the changes in the wage gap and in factors to which
it can be related, step-by-step, and year-by-year. This is done by analysing cross sectional
data from statistics Sweden (HINK) for the years 1981, 1983-1991 and 1993-1998. The
preliminary results show that the unadjusted wage gap varied between 15-20 percent up to
1989 when the differentials began to increase. During the 90s the size of the gap was around
25 percent. There is an increase in the wage differentials between the 1980s and late 1990s. In
a decomposition analysis we find that the measured differences in jobs and qualifications
between women and men can account only for between two and three fifths of the gender
wage gap, if they are assumed to be rewarded according to the wage function for men. If the
female wage function is applied, considerably less of the differentials are explained.
Differences in the educational requirements for jobs have contributed considerably to gender
earnings inequality. The impact has, however, decreased over the period studied and is about
half as large in the 1990s as it was in the 1980s.
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1. Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to follow the development of the Swedish gender earnings gap
through the 1980s and 1990s. In the course of these two decades, very significant changes
with strong impact on the wage setting process took place in Sweden. The most conspicuous
alteration is the increase in overall income and earnings differentiation in a country, which for
a long time was know as one of the least unegalitarian in this respect. It has been forcefully
argued, in international comparisons, that the greater the total spread in earnings, the larger
the gender gap (Blau and Kahn 1992). It may therefore be more than a coincidence that an
increase in earnings differentiation and a halt in the trend towards gender earnings equality
have occurred simultaneously in Sweden.
Behind, or concomitant with, the increase in differentiation are a whole series of institutional
and economic changes, such as the disintegration of the system of centralised wage
bargaining, the income tax reform of the early 90s, the boom of the 1980s, which was
followed in 1992-97 by a downturn with levels of unemployment unseen since the Great
Depression, Swedish entry into the European Union, the currency crises of 1992 and strong
fiscal pressure against public sector activities.
In this context of manifold events, we want to not just compare a certain point in time at the
beginning of this period with another at the end of it. We want to follow the changes in the
wage gap, and in factors to which it can be related, step-by-step, and year-by-year. We do this
by analysing data from repeated cross section surveys from Statistics Sweden (the HINK-
database) for the years 1981, 1983-1991 and 1993-1998. This data set will be discussed in
more detail below (section 4), but it can be said at the outset that we consider the quality of
sampling and interviewing etceteras, to be good. The problems with the data set are due, first,
to the fact that it was not created for the purpose of wage-analysis and, second, that some
questions and, thus, some variables have changed over the almost twenty years that the survey
has been conducted. Therefore we have had to use proxies for, or approximations of, some
important variables, because this was the best that the data permitted or to ensure
commensurability over time. To some extent, this is always the case in empirical analysis
covering a long time span. Any data including different points in time would have to take into
account, and make imputations to correct for, institutional changes, which necessitate changes
in definition and interpretation of variables.3
We consider, however, that to have this rich time-series, enables us to make a unique
contribution which should be seen as a complement, not an alternative, to studies based on
data sets which include other variables but not such a continuous development over time.
2. Theories
Attempts at explanation of inequality in earnings between women and men have traditionally
emphasised a number of interrelated explanatory mechanisms. Some of these mechanisms are
briefly described below. (For a more extensive discussion, see Katz, 1994, 2001.)
Economists distinguish two main types of explanation: “Pure” wage discrimination, which
means that women are paid less than equally productive men are. In neo-classical theory, this
discrimination is explained by “preferences for discrimination” on the part of employers, co-
workers or customers. If these preferences are not equally strong everywhere, in the long run,
discrimination would tend to be replaced by segregation (Becker, 1971, Cain, 1986).
The second line of argument is that women are paid less by profit-maximising employers
because they are less productive. Obviously, both things could be true, simultaneously and
explain parts of the gender gap in wages. Also, the reasons for the assumed lower productivity
of women include other forms of discrimination, both inside the labour market (in hiring, on-
the-job-training and promotion) and outside it (in households or education). The argument
may be made both in terms of the individual woman’s productivity and corresponding wage
and of employers paying all women according to the average productivity of female workers
(statistical discrimination).
According to some economists, because of the division of labour (specialisation) in the
household women have weaker labour market attachment and less incentive to invest time
and effort on education and careers. Since women often take more responsibility for family
and household work, women’s labour force participation is often interrupted and women more
often work part time (Mincer and Polachek 1974; Polachek 1981; Becker 1985). This would
imply that women generally accumulate less education; job training and work experience
compared to men and are hence, less productive and less paid. In particular, if women expect
to make career breaks, they may prefer occupations with higher starting wages but lower4
returns to experience (wage growth) in order to minimise the loss from temporary absence
(Polachek, 1981, Kim and Polachek, 1994). This hypothesis is, however, disputed. England et
al. (1988) estimate an earnings model with fixed (time- and individual-) effects on US panel
data to investigate the relationship between earnings and sex composition of occupations, for
black and white men and women. They find significant negative effects of percentage female
in the occupation on starting wages, for full-time workers in all four race/gender groups.
Thus, women do not appear to choose job with higher starting wages. England (1982) tests for
a relationship between sex composition, on the one hand, and rewards to experience or
"penalties" for post-school years spent out of the labour force, on the other and finds that
women do not maximise lifetime earnings by working in traditionally female occupations.
The theory of compensating differentials predicts that wages will be lower in jobs with more
desirable working conditions
1. It is feasible that men receive a higher wage as a compensation
for more unattractive working conditions. According to Filer (1985), because of different
tastes, men and women on the average choose occupations with different characteristics.
Daymont and Andrisani (1984) found that the values and preferences expressed by young
men were conducive to higher wages than those more common among young women. In this
case, there appears to be a “compensation” also for attractive features of male dominated jobs.
Sociologists often emphasise the effects of job segregation. According to this explanation
women tend to hold less advantageous work positions and to be employed within less
favourable work structures than men, regardless of intrinsic or potential productivity. Thus,
job segregation by sex is, in this sense, the main source of gender differences in labour market
out-comes. In the terminology of economic theory, job rationing allows discriminatory sorting
of women and men into branches and firms with different levels of productivity. Historical
and sociological studies find underestimation of the value and skill content of occupations
perceived as “female” (Walby, 1988, Phillips & Taylor, 1980).
Both the returns to skills and the size of the premium for employment in particular industries
have a potentially important role in the determination of the gender pay gap. (See e.g. Blau
and Kahn, 1999.) All else equal, the larger the returns to skills and the larger the rents
received by individuals in favoured industries, the larger the gender gap will be. Similarly,
                                               
1 See Rosen (1986).5
labour market discrimination and/or actual female deficits in unmeasured skills result in
employers treating women as if they had lower unmeasured as well as measured skills. Thus,
the higher the rewards to unmeasured skills, the larger the gender gap, after controlling for
measured characteristics
The distinction between wage differences due to (different kinds of) discrimination and
productivity related differentials is complicated by endogeneity or feedback effects. For
instance, if women expect not to be paid according to their “human capital” they may choose
to acquire less than they would have in the absence of discrimination.
3. Background and Previous Studies
The Swedish labour market is characterised by a high level of unionisation. Both the strong
legal standing of the collective bargain and the strength of Swedish trade unions (including
white-collared) and employer organisations make collective bargaining a central instrument
for labour market regulation. Since the eighties there has been a general tendency to
decentralise wage bargaining and contracts to the branch, and even to the firm, level. This
tendency to decentralisation of the bargaining process has not been limited to wage
bargaining but also concerned working time arrangements. Trade union membership in
Sweden has risen constantly since the mid-1960s even though the union density experienced a
weak decline in connection with the sharp increase of unemployment in the early 1990:s.
3.1 Women’s position in the labour market
The Swedish gender earnings gap was significantly reduced between the 60’s and the early
80’s. However, since the mid 80’s the reduction in wage inequality has been halted. One
explanation for the improved situation of Swedish women is the compression of the overall
wage structure. This particularly favoured women who often had wages in the lower deciles
of the distribution.  Another explanation behind the increasing relative wages for women prior
to the early 1980’s was the interplay of wage policy and demand/supply factors, which raised
the price of unskilled work, a large proportion of which was performed by women. A number
of political reforms strengthened women’s labour market attachment. Concerning direct legal
regulation of equal pay, Sweden as late as 1980 enforced an anti discrimination law.6
However, such regulation had in practice been enforced in the early 70’s through collective
bargaining.
The expansion of the educational system seems to have improved women’s position in the
labour market. Since, the mid 70’s the rate of enrolment in education of young women (20-24
years of age) has exceeded that of men, and it has increased over time. Separate taxation of
spouse was introduced in 1971 and, in conjunction with the progressive rates of taxation in
force until 1991, had a strong effect on the labour force participation of married women
(Gustafsson and Bruyn-Hundt, 1991). Subsidised child-care and a generous parental leave
system, relative to most countries, are important means for young women to retain their
labour force attachment and human capital accumulation, compared to leaving employment in
order to care for young children Gustafsson and Stafford, 1992). The work experience
foregone, as well as perceived depreciation of skills, during parental leave does, however,
have a considerable negative impact on wages (Albrecht et. al., 1997). A hypothetical
situation without employment breaks or with parental leave equally shared between parents
would result in a smaller gender wage gap.
3.2 Previous studies
Most studies of the Swedish gender wage gap focus on the 80:s and early 90:s. The most
frequently used data source is the Level of Living Survey (LNU), which covers the years
1968, 1981, 1991 and 2000. Another is the HUS panel. The 1984, 1986, 1993 waves of HUS
have been used for such studies.
A study by Löfström (1989) – using HUS 1984 - finds that the female/male wage ratio would
have been 15-25 percentage points higher in the absence of gender wage discrimination.
Among other thing she finds that returns of education and to work experience are lower for
women than for men. Andersson (1995) analyses HUS data for the years 1984, 1986 and
1993. He finds that the wage offer gap
2 increased over the years, and so did the amount which
can be ascribed to discrimination
3, but not to the same extent. In 1984 the male-female log
wage gap was 21 percentage points of which market discrimination accounted for 13
                                               
2 The wage gap corrected for selectivity, see section 4 below.
3 The method of decomposing wage differentials into one part attributable to characteristics and one ascribable to
discrimination is described in section 4, below.7
percentage points (or 60 % of the gap). In other words, according to his wage-model,
women’s wages would have been on average 13 percentage points higher on average in the
absence of discrimination. In 1986 this had increased slightly, while in 1993 the log wage gap
had increased to 23 percentage points, discrimination to 19 percentage points (81 % of the
gap). In separate analysis of wages in the public and private sectors, Andersson finds that the
log wage offer gap was 27 percentage points (19 % of which was discrimination) in the
private and 20 percentage points (15 % discrimination) in the public sector. In a further
decomposition of the productivity differentials, human capital variables turned out to be the
most important. Trying to trace compensating wage differentials, he finds that most of the
estimated parameters for undesirable job characteristics had negative signs, except for "shift
work".
Studying LNU data for 1981, le Grand (1991) finds that human capital and family obligation
explanations for the gender pay gap account for about 30 percent of the total gap. According
to his calculations, human capital variables explain approximately one-fifth of the gender pay
gap. However, job segregation seems to be the most important explanatory factor in the
model. Compensating wage differentials cannot be shown to make any significant
contribution to the gender pay gap. In a cross section analysis on LNU -81, -91 Le Grand
(1997) shows that the correlation between occupational segregation and wage does not
depend on female occupations being more compatible with housework and family obligation.
However, employees in male dominated occupations receive on average more on the job
training. According to le Grand the correlation between the gender composition in the
occupation and the wage can be explained by skill requirements, on the job training,
management responsibility, social class and sector.
Taking into account the explanations mentioned above there remains a wage effect due to the
proportion of women in the occupation, which cannot be explained by other variables. This
net wage effect -- which le Grand interprets as the lowest possible level for the valuation of
wage discrimination -- implies that women employed in a male dominated occupation (at
least 90 per cent men) receive at least 9 per cent more per hour compared to women in female
dominated occupations (90 per cent women). The corresponding difference for men is 6 per
cent. With a model that does not control for social class and occupational segregation, the
wage difference between male and female dominated occupations is 14 per cent for women
and 10 per cent for men.8
Palme and Wright (1992) test the hypothesis that there is a compensating wage differential
associated with undesirable job characteristics, using LNU 1981. Generally, they find no
evidence that the unexplained gender wage differences are associated with undesirable job
attributes.
Edin and Richardsson (1999) investigate the role of wage compression for the gender gap in
Sweden during the period 1968-1991 (using LNU data) and find that the effects of change in
the wage structure on women’s wages have varied over time and have partly counteracting
effects. According to Edin and Richardsson, changes in the wage structure were particularly
important up to the mid 70’s, but in 1981 the wage compression effect accounted only for a
minor proportion of women’s relative wage gains, compared to the mid 70’s. The small
increase in the gender wage gap between 1981 and 1991 seemed according to Edin and
Richardsson be driven by changed inter-industry wage differentials.
Arai and Thoursie (1997) finds that there are systematic, gender specific wage differentials,
i.e. women earn less than men both across and - even more so - within occupations, and that
these wage differentials cannot be explained by observed personal background characteristics,
or by individual productivity-related or job-related characteristics. If women were distributed
over occupational groups in the same way as men are, their share would fall noticeably in
"health and social work", "financial and office-technical work" and "services". On the other
hand, the female share would increase considerably in "manufacturing" and in "technical and
medical work, etc. "
According to Arai and Thoursie, if women chose or were selected into occupational groups in
the same way as men, the female share would increase considerably in the category "blue-
collar, skilled". The female share would also increase in the category "white-collar high level"
but would fall in "blue-collar, unskilled" and in "white-collar, unqualified". According to the
segregation indices, the differences in men and women's occupational choices cannot be
explained to any great extent by level of education.
Using register data from employers, Meyerson and Petersen (1997) study the gender wage
gap for women and men at the same work establishment and with similar duties and level of
position. They show that the total gender pay gap in 1990 was on average 12.8 percent for9
blue-collar workers and 27.8 for white-collar workers. According to their analysis the total
gender wage gap increased by 1.5 per cent between 1970 and 1990, while the gap for white-
collar workers declined during the period.
le Grand, Szulkin and Thålin (2001) follow changes in the Swedish wage structure through
the LNU. As Edin and Richardsson (ibid.), they find that the gender wage gap, both
unadjusted and adjusted for education and experience, decreased in the periods 1968-74 and
1974-81, particularly in the former, while it remained virtually constant 1981-91. The latest
wave of LNU, indicates that from 1991 to 2000 there was a slight decrease in the unadjusted
gap and a slight increase in the adjusted. le Grand, Szulkin and Thålin conclude that the most
important factors behind the decrease in the gender gap 1968-81 were an improvement in the
relative position of women compared to men in the same education and experience-categories
and, particularly during the first period, decreased wage differentiation within these
categories. Conversely, the convergence between men and women in terms of education and
experience after 1981 has not resulted in a commensurate convergence in wages, mainly
because wage differentiation, given education and experience, has grown.
le Grand, Szulkin and Thålin note that the adjusted gender wage gap was larger in the private
than in the public sector. In the first three waves of LNU women earned more in the public
than in the private sector, given education and experience. In 1991 and 2000 they earned more
in the private sector.
4. Empirical model
In order to examine determinants of female and male wages, cross-sectional wage equations
are estimated for the years 1981-1991 and 1993-1998. The first step is to estimate wage
equations separately for women and men. The hourly wage of individual i may be written as
i M i i e X W + = β ln [1]
if i is male and as
i F i i e X W + = β ln [2]10
if i is female. The subscripts M and F indicate that the parameter refers to male and female,
respectively. lnWi is the natural logarithm of the hourly wage, Xi  is a vector of variables
believed to determine earnings and e is an error term with zero mean and normal distribution.
It is common to refine the wage equation by using Heckman’s (1979) correction for sample
selection bias. In this case, a reduced-form probit equation of the probability of having any
observed wage (i.e. of Wi being greater than zero) is estimated and used for the construction
of the so-called Mills ratio, the inverse of which ("Heckman's lambda") is introduced into the
wage equation. The reason for the correction is that if the probability of being employed is
correlated with unobserved capacity to earn, the error term in the wage equation will be
correlated with wages. The distribution of observed wages will differ from the distribution of
"offered wages", which also include the potential wages of those who are not employed and
parameter estimates will be biased.
A correction was done in the present study, with a selection equation including dummies for
age categories, citizenship, marital status, presence of children in different age intervals,
regional (county level) unemployment rate and a variable indicating whether the individual is
entitled to disability benefits. The inverse of the Mill's ratio was significant in the wage
equation for women in six years out of 16, but only in two years for men. In addition, the
parameter for lambda in the male equations was negative in all but two cases (and in these it
was not significant). Because of this, and of the well-known difficulty of specifying the
selection equation correctly, we concluded that with the restrictive filters we had applied,
selectivity in employment did not significantly affect our results and that it was better to omit
the attempt at correction.
In this paper we will decompose the gender wage differential, following the standard method
of Oaxaca (1973). Since residuals are assumed to have zero mean, the difference between the
average log wages for men and women is:
) ˆ ˆ ( ) ln (ln F F M M F M X X W W β β − = −                  [3]11
where hats (^) denote parameter estimates (estimated by OLS) and bars (
-) indicate mean
values.
Assuming that a non-discriminatory wage structure, β*, is known it is possible to rewrite [3]
as:
* ) ( ) ˆ * ( *) ˆ ( ) ln (ln β β β β β F M F F M M F M X X X X W W − + − + − = − [4]
The terms  *) ˆ ( β β − M M X  and  ) ˆ * ( F F X β β −  on the right hand side in [4] may be interpreted
as possible discrimination. These terms represent the amount by which men’s and women’s
pay, respectively, differ from the assumed non-discriminatory wage. The third term,
* ) ( β F M X X − , represents difference in average characteristics between men and women
weighted by the non-discriminatory rate of return.
There are several ways of constructing the assumed non-discriminatory wage structure, β*. It
may be defined by a weighting matrix, as:
F M I β β β ˆ ) ( ˆ * Ω − + Ω = [5]
where Ω is a weighting matrix and I is the identity matrix.
Setting Ω=I implies that β*= M β ˆ  and equation [4] becomes
M F M F M F F M X X X W W β β β ˆ ) ( ) ˆ ˆ ( ) ln (ln − + − = −
With the opposite assumption, Ω=0, and β*= F β ˆ . Equation [4] becomes
F F M F M M F M X X X W W β β β ˆ ) ( ) ˆ ˆ ( ) ln (ln − + − = − [7]
In [6] the male wage function is treated as the true representation of the relationship between
characteristics and productivity, while the female function is assumed true in [7]. The last12
term in each of equations [4], [6] and [7] are called “the endowment term” or “the explained
part” because they indicate the part of the wage gap which can be attributed to measured
differences in characteristics (endowments). The remainder represents the part, which cannot
be explained by the variables included in the wage model, and is sometimes referred to as
“the discrimination term”,
Another possibility, as in Oaxaca and Ransom (1994) is to use Ω=) ' ( ) ' (
1
M M X X X X
− . This
produces a β* equal to the OLS-estimate that would be obtained from estimating the wage-
equation on the pooled sample of men and women.
5. Data and definitions
5.1 Data
The Swedish Household Income Survey (HINK) is a survey tailored to the study of income
distribution in Sweden, and has been conducted annually since the mid 70s. The reference
population consists of all persons living in Sweden at least half of the calendar year. Survey
data is collected through telephone interviews, but also from administrative registers and tax
return forms. Both the selected respondent (“the sampling person”), who has to be of age 18
or older, and his/her household, are included in the survey. HINK includes 10 000 – 18 000
households annually.
The survey is rich in variables concerning income, transfers and taxes. There are many
background-variables as well as, for example, the industry a person is working in, occupation,
region of residence and marital status. These characteristics, i.e. a relatively large sample, the
richness of variables and the fact that the survey is conducted annually, make it suitable to use
HINK to investigate the male-female wage gap in Sweden.
From HINK, we have drawn a sub-sample, consisting of respondents (“the sampling
persons”, not the other members of their households) 20-64 years of age, reporting any labour
related income. We have excluded self-employed, farmers and full-time students as well as
agricultural workers and persons working in forestry and fishing. In addition, observations13
with missing values for any variables used in the models are deleted. This has left us with data
sets including between 3400  and 5600  individuals each year.
4
5.2 Choice of model
The variables used in the wage equations are: age, age squared, dummy variables for level of
education, for being a blue- or white-collar worker, industry, region, for being employed in
central government, local government or in the private sector, citizenship, share women in
occupation. (For exact definitions, see Table A1.) As HINK is a stratified data set, where the
stratification has been changed several times during the period of study, we have used weights
when estimating mean values and in regressions. The weights are the inverse of the
probability of being included in the sample.
 6
As may be seen in Table A2, the classification of industry
7 and, more important, the variable
for wage per hour are defined somewhat differently in the period 1981 to 1991 compared to
the period 1993 to 1998.
8 In the period 1981 to 1991 it is not possible to measure the exact
working time, as respondents were asked about their normal, not actual, working time. This
means that absence due to sickness, parental leave or holidays are included in the working
time. For this reason, the calculation of hourly wages during the first period includes time as
well as pay both for working time, sick leave, parental leave and holidays.
9 During the period
1993 and onward, respondents are asked about their actual working time, not including time
of absence. For this period, hourly wage is, therefore, estimated from hours actually worked
and pay for this work.
                                               
4 The reason for excluding the two latter groups is that they are very small and in some survey waves there are
no female respondents working there. Also, we did not find any “natural” other group to include them in
6 The weights used in this study are not identical to those provided by Statistics Sweden for HINK, but based on
the same information. The original weights were constructed for the sample of all household members and had to
be adjusted to take into account that we only included the ”sampling persons”.
7 1981 to 1991 employed were classified according to SNI69, while from 1993 and onward they were classified
according to SNI92. At the relatively aggregated level used in this study discrepancies are not too large.
8 Also, the 1990-1991 tax-reform changed the definition of taxable income. This makes it difficult to compare
the wage gap before and after the tax reform.
9 As sickness benefits and pay for parental leave did not amount to 100% of wage during the period, these sums
are adjusted up to full payment. If we had not made this adjustment, there would have been larger downward
bias in the measurement of women’s wages than in that of men’s, since women use parental leave more often
than men. The initiation of the "employer-period" (arbetsgivarperiod) in the sickness benefits in 1992 makes it14
Also, it is not possible to determine the level of education of the individuals before 1988. To
take education into account, we have instead used the normal educational requirement for
positions, from the socio-economic classification of the population.
10 Thus, the variable does
not directly reflect education of the individual, but the educational requirement of the
occupation in which the individual is employed. This is not standard in wage-models but has
advantages as well as disadvantages. The standard education variables (years or highest level
of schooling) are included in wage equations as a measure of human capital, which is
assumed to be a determinant of the productivity of individuals. The human capital represented
by an education that is not utilised in the actual work of the respondent does not necessarily
increase productivity whereas knowledge and skills acquired in non-standard ways may be as
productivity enhancing as formal schooling. This is a rationale for including variables
indicating educational requirements for a position into the wage-equation. This rationale is
stronger the more education is seen as skill enhancing and weaker the more it is taken as just
signalling general ability.
This reasoning is in line with that behind the ORU models, which include either years of
Over-, Required and Under-education as three separate variables or years or level of required
education as well as dummies for being over- or undereducated. Hartog (2000) discusses
different measures of required education and specification of ORU-models. According to his
survey of studies from different countries, the results are very similar in three respects:
Returns to required schooling are higher than the returns to actual education. Years of over-
education are rewarded, but less than years of required education. Undereducated workers
earn less than workers in similar jobs who have the required level of education, but more than
workers with same level of education but in jobs where the required level is lower. Tests of
the ORU-model against the standard Mincer equation indicate that the ORU specification is
superior (see Hartog op. cit. and references therein). The Mincer model includes actual
education but omits required. Our model does the reverse. Thus, both approaches can be seen
                                                                                                                                                  
impossible to construct the hourly wage rate used between 1981-1991, therefore this year is excluded from the
analysis.
10 The classification is made as follows: unskilled blue-collar workers and some lower level white-collar workers
(where normal educational demands after primary education is less than two years) are being categorised as
having the lowest level of education. The second level includes those in jobs which require at least two but less
than three years of schooling beyond primary education, such as skilled blue-collar workers and some lower
level white-collar workers.. The third level of educational requirements is defined as at least three but less than
six years beyond primary education. This includes middle level white-collar workers. Last, higher white-collar
workers and staff in leading positions normally need the highest level of education, at least six years of education
after primary school.15
as faulty relative to a desirable ORU-model. The relationship of the ORU-model to economic
theory, in particular human capital theory, is complex. Since space does not permit an
extended discussion, the reader is referred to Hartog (op. cit.).
In the HINK-samples from 1988 onwards both actual and required education are available. 
11
Men are more likely than women and older respondents more likely than younger to have jobs
corresponding to a higher level of education than their formal schooling while women are
more likely to have higher education than the job requires. This agrees with the results of
Oscarsson (2001) and Böhlmark (2001) as well as with studies from other countries (for
references, see Böhlmark, 2001)
Oscarsson (2001) finds that the share of under-educated workers in the Swedish private sector
in 1999 was about 35 percent while 9 percent were over-educated. The probability of being
under-educated is larger for men, increases with age and decreases with experience. The
largest group of under-educated is men with lower secondary education working in jobs that
require upper secondary education.
According to Oscarsson, the probability of under-education is highest in knowledge-intensive
industries. When an industry goes through rapid expansion and technological change, formal
training for jobs may not be available or not able to keep pace with demand. This may create
openings for "self-taught" workers or on-the-job learning as a substitute for formal education.
Examples are engineering industries and some services 30-40 years ago and the young IT-
industries today. We consider under-education partly to reflect periods when the rate of
structural change and social mobility in the Swedish economy were higher than the rate of
expansion or adjustment of the education system. The fact that more men than women in the
                                               
11Our proxy for education is correlated with the actual level. From 1988 onward, we have information about the
educational attainment of individuals. Of respondents in our lowest education category, 31-34 percent have only
primary education (the range is over the years of observation), 48-62 percent have secondary education (mostly
short secondary education), and 2-7 percent have university education. In the second category, 18-32 percent
have primary education, 59-71 percent secondary (mostly short), and 5-11 percent university education. In the
third educational category, 8-15 percent have primary education, 32-40 percent secondary education and 45-56
percent university education (mostly shorter than three years). Finally, in the highest category of education, 3-8
percent have only primary education, 18-24 percent have secondary education and 68-77 percent have university
education (mostly longer than three years). Conversely, of those with primary education (förgymnasial
utbildning), 36-49 percent are being categorised in the lowest category of educational requirements, 18-27 in the
second category, 8-10 in the third, and last, only 2-3 percent in the highest category of education. 29-39 percent
of respondents with secondary education (gymnasial utbildning) fall in the lowest category, 29-38 percent in the
second category, 13-19 percent in the third and 4-6 percent in the highest. Of those who have university16
sample have lower education than is usually required for their jobs, indicates that the
possibility of advancement without the formal qualifications was greater for men.
According to both Oscarsson and Böhlmark (ops. cit.) women and immigrants are more likely
than men to be over-educated which may indicate discrimination, and the likelihood decreases
with experience, which could reflect that search time is necessary for job-education matching.
The share of women in occupation was measured at the two-digit level of classification. Some
occupations in some years included few observations. To increase precision and stability in
estimates the average share for the whole period was used instead of the share for each year.
The model was also estimated with variables for occupation at the one-digit level of
classification added. Including occupation, industry and share female in occupation created
problems of collinearity and the parameter estimates became quite volatile. Therefore
occupational categories were omitted from the final model. We can note, however, that the
sample shows a high degree of occupational segregation by gender. The three most common
occupations for women are health care-, service- and accounting and clerical work. While
these categories together include 55-60 percent of the women, only about 10-15 percent of the
men belong to them. For men, mining- and manufacturing and scientific and technical
occupations make up about 60-65 percent of the male workforce, but only about 20 percent of
the female. During the period, most occupations have maintained their share of population at
a relatively stable level.
Another aspect of segregation is the predominance of women in the local government sector.
While most studies only control for public versus private sector employment, the HINK data
allow us to distinguish also between central and local government.
The earlier waves of HINK do not include information about country of birth, only about
citizenship. (In a more detailed study of the 1990's we have access to information about
country of birth.). We included dummies for Swedish, Nordic and non-Nordic citizenship. A
more detailed division was not meaningful due to the limited number of observations.
                                                                                                                                                  
education, 3-7 percent are included in the lowest category of educational requirements, 7-10 percent in the
second category , 38-53 percent in the third and 29-41 percent in the highest.17
Descriptive statistics of the data are found in Tables A2-A3 in the appendix.
6. Results
6.1 Average wage differentials
TABLE 1A AND 1B ABOUT HERE
Table 1A shows observed arithmetic mean differentials and geometric mean differentials of
hourly wages expressed in percent of the female wage. The table shows that the wage gap was
between 15-20 percent up until 1989, when there was a relatively sharp increase in the gender
wage gap.
12 In the 90s the observed differentials are between 20-25 percent. There is no
marked trend either during the 1980s or the 1990s, but two different levels. Both measures
indicate an increase in the wage differentials between 1981 and 1998.
Some increase in the gender gap in 1990 could be an artefact due to the tax reform 1990-
1991. By decreasing marginal tax rates in higher income brackets and widening the tax base,
the reform encouraged a shift from non-monetary fringe benefits to salaries. A more detailed
look at wage growth 1989/90 and 1990/91 for different gender and socio-economic categories
in the private and public sector led us to the conclusion that this was not an important reason
for the observed increase in the gender gap.
13
                                               
12 It is worth noting that the increase in the gender wage gap occurs before both the tax-reform of 1991 and the
changed income-definition in the HINK-data from 1993 onwards, which indicates that the increase is not due to
changes of definition of income.
13 If  men are more likely to have enjoyed fringe benefits than women, a shift from beneftis to money would
make an existing but hidden gap visible in the wage data. Therefore we have looked at the year-to-year
development of nominal wages for 12 subsamples - male and female higher level and middle/lower level white
collar staff and blue collar workers in the private and public sectors, respectively. It seems reasonable to assume
that higher level white collar staff in the private sector are likely to have most fringe benefits. There could also
be a bias towards men, within categories. What we find is that the gender gap increases in all categories in 1990,
but more in the public than in the private sector, if the average is taken across socio-economic categories. The
growth 1989/90 is highest for female higher level employees in the public sector. It is also high for male higher
and lower white collar workers in the public sector and female higher level employees in the private, but not for
male. Whatever drives the increase in the gender gap that particular year, it does not seem to be high increase in
monetary rewards to male managerial staff in the private sector which would be the main expected "tax reform
effect". The following year, 1991, higher level male employees in the private sector do have higher wage growth18
Table 1B shows the unadjusted geometric mean differentials (same as in Table 1A) as well as
the differentials adjusted for the wage structure. We find that both the adjusted and the
unadjusted gender wage gaps increase over time. This agrees with Holmlund (2001) who
finds a slightly lower gender wage ratio in 1998 than in 1992 and a slightly larger adjusted
wage gap. le Grand et. al. (2001) find that the unadjusted gender differential increased from
1981 to 1991 and decreased from 1991 to 2000. (The total increase is three percentage
points.) The gender differential adjusted for human capital variables and for working in the
private sector is practically constant. This differs from our results, both as regards the size of
the increase in the observed gap and in that we find an increase also in the adjusted gap. (The
results need not be incompatible since we control for more variables.)
In both studies decompositions of the Juhn-Murphy-Pierce type are performed and indicate
that while ceteris paribus the convergence in qualifications between employed women and
men should have caused a convergence also in wages, changes in the wage structure, which
were unfavourable to women, resulted in a net increase in the gender gap. This is very much
consistent with our finding of an increased difference between adjusted and unadjusted wage
gaps. (See table 2.)
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE
In Table 2 our results are compared to those of other studies estimating gender wage
differentials on Swedish data. The differences between estimates made within a short time
period and between different studies using the same data indicate that results of this kind of
estimates are sensitive to changes in sampling, sample inclusion and definitions.
6.2 Mean values
The variable means as well as sample sizes for women and men, respectively, are reported in
Table A2 and Table A3. In this section we will summarise the main changes in labour force
characteristics for women and men over the period of observations.
                                                                                                                                                  
than other groups, which may have something to do with the tax reform. But in 1991 there is little change in the
gender gap.19
Mean age was fairly constant over time, for both women and men, approximately 39 years,
until the beginning of the 1990s. At this point mean age began to increase, faster for women
than for men. In 1998, mean age was about 42 years for women and 41 for men, mainly
because the number of employed women aged 45-54 grew faster than that of men of that age
during this period.
Men had a higher average level of education, or rather jobs with a higher level of educational
requirements, than women during the whole period under study but, although the level
increased for both sexes, the increase was larger for women. Thus the education gap was
reduced over this period. As was explained in the previous section, "educational
requirements", is divided into four categories. For women, the share in the lowest category of
education decreased from over 50 percent to about 35 percent, the share in the second
category was roughly constant with 24-27 percent of the population. The shares of the
population belonging to the two highest categories of education increased during the period.
For women, the third category increased from 15-20 percent in the beginning of the period to
just over 25 percent at the end of it, while the share of the highest category increased from
about 6 to 15 percent. For men, the lowest category of education decreases from about 30
percent to 25 percent. Also, the share in the second category of education decreases from
about 35 percent to about 30 percent. The two highest levels of education increased their
share of the male population also, from about 20 percent to about 25 percent and from 13
percent to 20 percent, respectively.
There are also large differences between the distributions of male and female employees over
the nine main industries Just over a half of the women work in the social and related
community services industry (including education and health care), while this is true for only
12-14 percent of male workers. About one third of the men are working in the mining and
manufacturing industry. Of the women, 11-14 percent are working here. These shares are also
relatively stable over time. The share of the employed
14 working in mining- and
manufacturing industry decreases somewhat, while the share working in financial institutions,
insurance, real estate and business service industry and social and related community service
industry increases slightly.
                                               
14 For simplicity, ”employed” is used for working respondents even though we have excluded the self-employed.20
Of employed men, 71-83 percent work in the private sector, while this is the case for 38-46
percent of employed women. Both shares increase over time. About half of the women work
in local government, but only 11-17 percent of the men. The shares working in central
government are rather similar: 5-11 percent of the women and 6-16 percent of the men. The
total share working in central government has decreased from over 20 percent in the early
1980s to 13 percent in 1998. One reason is the transfer of schools from central to local
government authority. Despite this, there is nevertheless a decrease in local government
employment in the 1990s.
6.3 Regression results
This section mainly reports the development of the parameter estimates. In Table A4 and
Table A5, we report the results for the years 1981, 1986, 1991, 1995 and 1998 for women and
men, respectively. (Estimates for the remaining years are available from the authors on
request.)
Starting with parameter estimates for educational requirement, estimates are relatively stable
over time. There are no large differences between estimates for women and men either during
the 1980s or the 1990s. However, during the 1990s, the earnings premium for being in the
highest educational category falls slightly.
If education requirements for a job always matched the actual education of the incumbent, the
estimated premium for a given education-level would be the same irrespective of whether
required or actual education was used. If the mismatches were all due to under-education, it
follows from the argument in section 5.2, that the premium for "university education" would
be lower if this means "university education required" than if it meant "respondent has
university education".
Conversely, if all mismatches were due to over-education, the "university premium" would be
higher if it referred to "required university education" than if it meant "actual university
education".21
le Grand et al. (2001), Oscarsson (2001) and Böhlmark (2001) all find that over-education is
relatively more common among Swedish women than among men, while under-education is
more common among men. If this is true also for the HINK sample and if the effects of over-
and under-education were the same for men and women, the estimated difference between
male and female premia for higher education, would come out smaller in the equations using
required education than if we had used actual education
15. The last "if" is, of course, a big
one, and impossible to prove. It seems, however, a plausible hypothesis to say that a reason
why while the premia for higher education for men is clearly higher than that for women
according to the studies of Holmlund (2001) and le Grand et. al (2001), this is not the case
with our "required-education"-estimates. At least, the results are not incompatible.
The dummy variable for being a white-collar worker has a positive effect on male wages,
while there is no visible effect on female wages. This may indicate that the difference in pay
between female dominated and male dominated occupations is larger for white-collar work
than for blue-collar work.
Effects on earnings of living in different regions are all relatively small and insignificant. The
exception is living in the Stockholm region, which entails significantly higher pay throughout
the period. At the end of the period, there is also a significant wage premium for living in the
Göteborg or Malmö regions.
Working in central government, local government or in private sector does not seem to have
much effect on wage rates, for either women or men, when industry is controlled for. Yet, in
some years we find a significant positive wage premium for men working in central
government, compared to the private sector.
                                               
15 To make the argument clearer: Assume that a wage equation is estimated with a variable for "a job which
requires higher education" for men and women. respectively. Call the parameter for this variable α A second
equation is estimated with a variable for actual university education, instead- Call the parameter β. Our argument
implies that for each sex i, the difference δi= αi - βi is smaller, the greater the proportion of undereducated, and
greater the proportion of overeducated individuals.
To conclude from this that δf > δm we would need to know not only that the level of actual education relative to
required education is higher for women, we would need to know that the impact of "non-matching" education is
the same for men and women. If and only if the latter is true, it follows logically that (αm - αf) - (βm - βf) = (αm -
βm) - (αf - βf) = δm - δf  < 0
and, thus, (αm - αf) < (βm - βf), i.e. that our specification produces a small gender difference in education premia
than a standard Mincer specification.22
Also, having a foreign citizenship does not seem to affect wages much, in either direction
although the parameter for being born in other countries than the Nordic is significant in some
wage-regressions. However, it may be the case that the disadvantages for immigrants
consisted more of being excluded from the labour market than in wage discrimination (see le
Grand and Szulkin, 2000). Given the relative small number of non-Swedish nationals in our
sample, conclusions from it must, however, be only tentative.
The share of women in an occupation has no significant effect on wages for women, but for
most years there is a significant negative effect on wages for men. It appears that women
would not gain much in terms of wages by switching to traditionally male-dominated jobs but
men are penalised if they choose to work in a female dominated occupation.
Finally, the parameters for sector as well as for industry fluctuate heavily. There are two
possible explanations for this – first, the numbers of observations in some of these categories
are very small for either of the sexes and second, sector, share of women and industry of
occupation are all correlated which makes the estimates makes the estimates unstable, even
though we have omitted the occupation dummies (see above).
.
6.4 Decomposition results
Tables 3 and 4 show the decomposition of the endowment term into parts attributable to
different variables or groups of variables, (in percent of the total log differential), weighted
according to the female and male equations respectively, as described in section 4 above.
TABLES 3 AND 4 ABOUT HERE
A positive number may be interpreted as the percentage by which the gender wage gap would
be reduced if men and women were equal in respect to this characteristic assuming that the
characteristic is rewarded according to the estimated wage function for women/men. If a term
is negative it means that if women were more like men in this respect but wage functions
remained the same, the gender gap would actually increase. As an illustrative example, the
variables for region tend to produce a negative contribution to the wage gap of 1-2 percent.23
Both men and women have somewhat higher wages in the Stockholm region (all else equal).
Therefore the slightly higher share of the female workforce living in Stockholm raises
women’s average wage relative to that of men. If as few women as men lived there, the
gender gap would increase.
The first column in Table 4 shows that if the male wage equation is used as a benchmark the
variables included in our wage equation explain a part of the gender wage gap. The results
indicate that if we evaluate jobs and qualifications as is done in the male wage equation, then
differences in terms of these account for between 45 and 60 percent (with the exception of
1985 and 1987) of the gender wage gap. The rest remains unexplained by the variables in this
model.
Table 3, however, indicates that if male and female endowments had been similar, the wage
gap would have been reduced also if they were rewarded according to the female wage
function, but by much less than according to the male function.
The education (or, to be precise, educational requirement) term has had a considerable impact
on gender earnings differences, irrespective of which wage function we use. The impact has,
however, decreased over the period studied and is about half as big in the 1990s as it was in
the 1980s. Most of the share attributable to education is due to the premium for the highest
education category. Most of the decrease over time is explained by a decreasing difference
between the proportions of women and men whose jobs require this level of education.
During the first part of the period of observation, the average age of male and female
respondents is almost the same. In the second half of the 1990s, the average age of female
respondents is about a year higher than that of male. Since there is a positive age premium,
this reduces the gender gap, although by a very small amount.
Neither gender differences in region of residence or in country of birth have any impact on the
wage gap. In the regressions, only “living in Stockholm” was significant among the regional
dummies but the differences in proportions between men and women are small. Being a
citizen of a Nordic country other than Sweden cannot be shown to have any importance for
the overall gender wage gap – since only 2-4 percent of the samples are foreign citizens it24
would have taken a very large difference in degree of discrimination of male and female
immigrants to contribute significantly to the endowment term.
Concerning the endowment term attributable to sector of occupation, i.e. central and local
government in relation to private sector, it is interesting to note that the main impact is found
for employment in local government irrespective of which wage function we use. However,
the term is volatile and we find no clear trend over time but on average it tends to reduce the
gender pay gap.
The term attributable to the proportion of women in occupation indicates a strong positive
impact on the gender wage gap using the male equation. When using the female equation the
term is negative in the majority of years. In the cases when it is positive, it is small. This may
indicate that women, given their wage structure, do not choose jobs that are badly paid.
However, because of the quality of the variable we are cautious in drawing further
conclusions from this term in the decomposition analysis. Generally, we find very little
impact of the term attributable to white-collar worker.
7. Summary and Conclusions
In this paper we have analysed the development of the Swedish gender earnings gap through
the 1980s and the 1990s. We followed changes in the wage gap and in factors to which it can
be related and focused on trends and patterns rather than individual years.
One such pattern was the variation in the observed wage differentials, which varied between
15-18 percent of the average female wage up to 1989 when the differentials increased. During
the 1990s the differential varied between 20-25 percent. Since the data allows us to study each
year we can see that the shift is attributable to a change in the level rather than a continuous
increasing trend.
In the first stage of the empirical analysis separate wage equations were estimated for women
and men. We find small differences between women’s and men’s earnings premium in the
highest category, a difference that has decreased over the period observed. Thus, while the
premium for higher education for men is clearly higher than that for women according to the25
studies of Holmlund (2001) and le Grand et. al (2001), this is not the case with our estimates.
A plausible reason for this is that in our specification "university education" means that this is
required for the job, in theirs it stands for acquired education. Due to gender differences in
incidence and wage-impact of over- and under-education, the choice of variables is likely to
affect results.
The proportion of women in occupation generally had a negative effect on men’s wages,
while the parameter estimates were not conclusive for women. Thus, it appears to be the case
that men working in female dominated occupations are being penalised in terms of pay, but
there is not conclusive evidence of a corresponding reward for women entering male
dominated jobs. Among men, white-collar workers generally gain compared to blue-collar
workers, while, again, the results are inconclusive for women. We found no clear evidence
that work in central government, local government or private sector affect wages much.
Industry parameters fluctuate heavily and we found no clear effects on either women’s or
men’s wages. One reason for this could be that the numbers of observations in some of these
categories are very small with respect to gender and second, industry, public/private
employment and share of women in occupation all are correlated which makes the estimates
volatile.
As expected living in the Stockholm region entails significantly higher pay throughout the
period and is also true for the larger cities (Göteborg and Malmö) during the economic upturn
in the late 1990’s. There was, however, no evidence that foreign citizenship affected wages
negatively, which is almost certainly caused by the small numbers of immigrants in the
sample.
When differences in observed characteristics between male and female employees were
evaluated according to the wage function for men, they accounted for almost exactly one half
of the gender wage gap. This is taking averages of the "endowment share" over the years. For
all but two years, the share is within the range 46-54 percent. When the differences in
endowments are priced according to the female wage function the percentage accounted is
considerably smaller but also fluctuates more - from -4 to +25 percent (even when one
"outlier" year is excluded). When using the female wage function we see a tendency for the
endowment share to increase over time, but not when using the male. (If anything, there is a26
very slightly tendency for it to increase.) The difference between the endowment shares when
using male or female parameters indicates a large "chilling effect" in Sweden (Daymont and
Andrisani, 1984). In other words, men loose much and women gain relatively little by
acquiring untypical labour market characteristics
Instead of shares of a varying gender wage gap we can look at the percentage point-difference
between male and female wages that cannot be accounted for by the model. This amount turns
out to be more stable over time. When endowments are evaluated according to the male wage
function, a gender gap of 6-9 percentage points is unexplained in 1981-91 (with one
exception) and of 10-11 percent in 1993-1998. When the female wage function is used, the
"discrimination term" corresponds to a gender gap of 11-15 percent in 1981-91 and of 15-19
percent in 1993-98. Thus, in these terms we see an increase in the gender wage gap over time,
despite some convergence in observed characteristics which, all else equal, would have
decreased it. This agrees with other studies of the 1980s and 1990s.
Although our analysis confirms the results of previous studies concerning human capital
factors and the development of the gender wage gap over time it is difficult to disentangle
some driving forces behind this trend. The distinct shift in the observed wage differentials
between 1989 and 1990 is clearly an interesting new feature. As mentioned above, our results
indicate that the difference between adjusted and unadjusted wage gap has increased over the
period. In the light of our results, as well as of other studies cited above, we believe this to be
mainly attributable changes in the wage structure, which are not well captured by standard
human capital and job-characteristics. Further analysis should concentrate therefore on
structures, on wage setting, employment and promotion procedures as well as other
institutional factors.27
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Table 1A. Male-female wage differentials (percent)
Observed arithmetic mean
differentials
 a Observed geometric mean
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1981 18.3 9.5 0.85 0.91 8.8
1982
1983 14.4 6.7 0.87 0.94 7.8
1984 15.0 7.7 0.87 0.93 7.3
1985 17.0 11.1 0.85 0.90 5.8
1986 15.0 6.5 0.87 0.94 8.5
1987 15.6 2.9 0.86 0.97 12.7
1988 18.0 9.3 0.85 0.92 8.7
1989 16.4 6.6 0.86 0.94 9.8
1990 21.1 9.7 0.83 0.91 11.4
1991 19.2 9.4 0.84 0.91 9.8
1992
1993 23.0 12.1 0.81 0.89 10.9
1994 21.9 11.0 0.82 0.90 10.8
1995 24.5 12.9 0.80 0.89 11.6
1996 23.5 12.0 0.81 0.89 11.5
1997 21.8 11.5 0.82 0.90 10.4
1998 22.8 11.5 0.81 0.90 11.4
1998 22.8 11.5 0.81 0.90 11.4
a [ ] 100 1 ) ln ln exp( x W W F M − −
b [ ] 100 1 )) ( ln ln exp( x X W M F M − − β
c Average female wage in percent of male32











c 24    (18.7)
1981




c 22    (20.9)
1991





g 23.1 (16.4) 21.0 (15.0)
1986
g 13.4 (14.7) 18.5 (15.0)
1993
g 17.5 (23.0) 19.5 (23.0)
*Corresponding HINK-results in brackets
a 
Palme and Wright (1992)
b
 le Grand (1991)
c
 Arai and Thoursie (1997)
d
 Gustafsson and Lantz (1985)
e
 Edin and Richardsson (1999)
f
 le Grand (1994)
g
 Andersson (1995)33
Table 3. Decomposition of the gender gap in log wages using women’s parameter estimate in
percent
FEND EDUC SEITJM AGE INDUST REG CITIZEN STATE MUNICIP PR W
1981 82 9 0 02 00 0 2 - 1 2- 3 0
1982
1983 12 18 -1 12 70 0 4 - 1 9- 1 9
1984 -4 13 0 0- 6 - 1 1 - 1 6 - 1 5
1985 47 24 2 -1 12 0 0 -1 8 4
1986 -4 14 0 -1 15 -1 0 -1 2 -32
1987 21 7 0 0- 2 - 2 0 - 1 3 - 1 4
1988 29 -1 0 5 -1 0 0 -3 -8
1989 12 10 0 -2 -11 0 0 0 13 3
1990 16 22 0 0 - 3 - 1 007 - 9
1991 15 16 1 -1 4 0 0 0 8 -12
1992
1993 20 9 0 -1 14 0 0 0 2 -4
1994 41 4 0 1 - 5 0 008 - 1 3
1995 96 0 -2 9 1 0 0 -5 1
1996 16 7 -1 -1 3 0 0 0 11 -3
1997 21 6 -1 -8 18 -2 0 0 2 5
1998 26 10 0 -3 23 -1 0 0 -4 0
FEND total endowment term in percent of total wage gap, weighted by parameters in the
wage equation for women.
EDUC; Seiutb1-Seiutb4
AGE ;        Age, Age2
INDUST;     Ngr23-Ngr93
REG;        RegSth-RegN2790
CITIZEN ;    FSverige, FNorden, FOvarlden
STATE;        Yrkst1
MUNIC;   Yrkst2
PR W;        Andkvin34
Table 4. Decomposition of the gender gap in log wages using men’s parameter estimate in
percent
MEND EDUC SEITJM AGE INDUST REG CITIZEN STATE MUNIC PR W
1981 46 25 1 03 00 1 - 31 9
1982
1983 52 18 -6 22 9 0 0 0 - 1 92 2
1984 47 7 -7 0 32 -1 0 1 -16 24
1985 33 11 -4 -2 -1 -1 0 -1 3 23
1986 55 14 -4 -1 15 -1 0 1 -1 28
1987 80 20 -3 03 3- 1 0 1 - 7 3 6
1988 46 20 -1 02 3- 1 0 0 2 3
1989 58 10 -2 -3 24 0 0 0 9 17
1990 52 19 -2 -1 16 0 -1 1 -6 23
1991 49 13 -2 02 3 0 0 1 - 6 1 9
1992
1993 45 9 -2 -1 7 -1 0 0 2 29
1994 47 11 -3 11 3 0 0 1 5 1 7
1995 45 2 -4 -2 17 1 0 0 14 12
1996 46 8 -2 -1 17 -1 -1 0 15 10
1997 45 0 -8 -6 44 -3 0 1 -20 29
1998 48 6 -3 -3 25 -1 0 0 0 20
MEND total endowment term in percent of total wage gap, weighted by parameters in the
wage equation for men.
EDUC; Seiutb1-Seiutb4
AGE ; Age, Age2
INDUSTRY;Ngr23-Ngr93
REG; RegSth-RegN2790





Table A1. Definitions of variables
Variable Definition of variable
LnWH Natural logarithm of wage per hour
   -1981 to 1991 the working time is defined as the number of hours a person
     usually is gainfully employed including holidays, sickness periods, and
     periods of parental leave. The wage includes pay for work as well as holiday
     pay, benefits for sickness absenteeism and parental leave.
   -From 1993 and onwards, the working time is defined as the number of hours
     a person actually is gainfully employed, not including holidays, sickness
     periods, and periods of parental leave. The wage includes pay for work.
Age Age
Age2 Age squared
SeiUtb1 Division of educational variables is based on socio-economic classification
standards. Normal educational demands after primary education less than two
years.
SeiUtb2 Division of educational variables is based on socio-economic classification
standards. Normal educational demands after primary education at least two but
less than three years.
SeiUtb3 Division of educational variables is based on socio-economic classification
standards. Normal educational demands after primary education at least three
but less than six years.
SeiUtb4 Division of educational variables is based on socio-economic classification




Ngr23 Mining- and manufacturing branch (1981-1991 according to SNI69, 1993 and
onwards according to SNI92)
Ngr4 Electricity and gas branch (1981-1991 according to SNI69, 1993 and onwards
according to SNI92)
Ngr5 Construction branch (1981-1991 according to SNI69, 1993 and onwards
according to SNI92)
Ngr6 Retail trade, restaurants and hotel branch (1981-1991 according to SNI69, 1993
and onwards according to SNI92)
Ngr7 Transport and communication branch (1981-1991 according to SNI69, 1993 and
onwards according to SNI92)
Ngr8 Financial institutions, insurance, real estate and business service branch (1981-
1991 according to SNI69, 1993 and onwards according to SNI92)
Ngr9 Public administration and defence branch (1981-1991 according to SNI69, 1993
and onwards according to SNI92)
Ngr93 Social and related community services (1981-1991 according to SNI69, 1993
and onwards according to SNI92)
RegSth Stockholm (H-region 1)
RegGbgMa Göteborg or Malmö (H-region 2)
Reg90 Medium-sized cities (H-region 3)
RegS2790 Southern Sweden (H-region 4)36
RegN2790 Densely populated northern Sweden (H-region 5)
RegNGl Sparsely populated northern Sweden (H-region 6)
Yrkst1 Employed by central government
Yrkst2 Employed by local government




Andkvin Percentage of female in occupation (estimated from HINK-data on two-digit
level)37
Table A2. Descriptive statistics for the female respondents.
1981 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
WH 38,99 44,61 47,31 51,27 56,06 59,23 64,85 68,61 76,66 83,97 86,02 89,82 88,64 94,37 97,27 101,33
LWH 3,61 3,75 3,80 3,87 3,96 4,02 4,10 4,17 4,28 4,37 4,38 4,42 4,41 4,47 4,51 4,54
AGE 39,49 39,19 38,60 38,88 39,45 39,16 38,94 39,37 39,76 39,89 40,42 40,46 40,86 41,39 42,20 41,87
SEIUTB1 0,57 0,50 0,48 0,49 0,49 0,47 0,47 0,46 0,45 0,42 0,40 0,40 0,38 0,38 0,36 0,35
SEIUTB2 0,23 0,25 0,25 0,25 0,26 0,27 0,24 0,27 0,27 0,27 0,25 0,26 0,27 0,25 0,24 0,25
SEIUTB3 0,15 0,19 0,21 0,20 0,19 0,19 0,21 0,21 0,22 0,23 0,24 0,25 0,24 0,26 0,28 0,26
SEIUTB4 0,06 0,06 0,06 0,06 0,07 0,07 0,08 0,06 0,06 0,08 0,10 0,09 0,11 0,11 0,13 0,15
SEIARB 0,53 0,49 0,48 0,48 0,49 0,47 0,48 0,50 0,49 0,46 0,44 0,45 0,43 0,43 0,38 0,40
SEITJM 0,47 0,51 0,52 0,52 0,51 0,53 0,52 0,50 0,51 0,54 0,56 0,55 0,57 0,57 0,62 0,60
NGR23 0,15 0,12 0,14 0,13 0,14 0,13 0,13 0,13 0,13 0,12 0,11 0,11 0,11 0,11 0,12 0,11
NGR4 0,00 0,00 0,01 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,01 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,01 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
NGR5 0,01 0,02 0,01 0,02 0,01 0,01 0,01 0,01 0,01 0,01 0,01 0,01 0,01 0,01 0,01 0,01
NGR6 0,14 0,15 0,12 0,13 0,13 0,14 0,13 0,14 0,14 0,12 0,14 0,12 0,12 0,15 0,13 0,13
NGR7 0,04 0,04 0,06 0,05 0,04 0,05 0,06 0,05 0,05 0,05 0,05 0,04 0,04 0,04 0,04 0,04
NGR8 0,07 0,07 0,07 0,08 0,08 0,08 0,08 0,08 0,08 0,09 0,08 0,09 0,09 0,09 0,10 0,10
NGR9 0,09 0,09 0,09 0,08 0,08 0,08 0,07 0,07 0,07 0,08 0,09 0,09 0,08 0,07 0,06 0,07
NGR93 0,50 0,52 0,50 0,51 0,52 0,52 0,51 0,51 0,51 0,53 0,52 0,54 0,55 0,53 0,54 0,54
REGSTH 0,19 0,19 0,20 0,21 0,19 0,21 0,21 0,19 0,20 0,20 0,21 0,20 0,20 0,21 0,21 0,21
REGGBGMA 0,15 0,14 0,15 0,15 0,13 0,14 0,16 0,15 0,14 0,15 0,16 0,14 0,14 0,15 0,14 0,14
REG90 0,33 0,32 0,32 0,33 0,33 0,31 0,30 0,32 0,36 0,36 0,35 0,35 0,37 0,39 0,36 0,37
REGS2790 0,19 0,21 0,20 0,19 0,22 0,20 0,19 0,20 0,18 0,18 0,18 0,19 0,19 0,16 0,18 0,17
REGN2790 0,09 0,08 0,09 0,07 0,08 0,09 0,09 0,08 0,05 0,06 0,06 0,06 0,05 0,06 0,07 0,06
REGNGL 0,06 0,07 0,05 0,05 0,05 0,05 0,05 0,06 0,06 0,05 0,04 0,05 0,05 0,04 0,04 0,05
YRKST1 0,09 0,09 0,11 0,10 0,09 0,09 0,09 0,08 0,08 0,09 0,09 0,07 0,06 0,05 0,07 0,07
YRKST2 0,48 0,52 0,51 0,51 0,52 0,51 0,51 0,51 0,51 0,52 0,50 0,52 0,50 0,49 0,48 0,48
YRKST3 0,42 0,39 0,38 0,39 0,39 0,40 0,40 0,40 0,41 0,39 0,42 0,41 0,44 0,46 0,46 0,45
FODSV 0,94 0,96 0,96 0,96 0,97 0,96 0,96 0,96 0,96 0,96 0,96 0,96 0,97 0,97 0,96 0,97
FNORDEN 0,04 0,02 0,02 0,02 0,02 0,02 0,02 0,03 0,02 0,02 0,03 0,03 0,02 0,02 0,02 0,02
FOVARLD 0,02 0,01 0,02 0,02 0,01 0,01 0,02 0,02 0,02 0,02 0,02 0,01 0,02 0,01 0,02 0,01
ANDKVIN 0,72 0,73 0,70 0,72 0,72 0,71 0,72 0,72 0,71 0,71 0,71 0,72 0,71 0,70 0,66 0,67
Antal obs 1944 1946 1921 2004 2088 2118 2096 2346 2191 2309 2666 1914 2822 1902 2743 192938
Table A3. Descriptive statistics for the male respondents.
1981 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
WH 46,29 51,92 54,59 59,72 64,31 68,65 76,07 79,97 93,55 101,53 105,79 110,31 110,77 118,17 120,37 125,36
LWH 3,78 3,88 3,94 4,03 4,10 4,17 4,27 4,33 4,47 4,55 4,58 4,62 4,63 4,68 4,71 4,75
AGE 39,18 39,52 39,15 38,88 39,43 39,38 38,94 38,92 39,70 39,67 40,08 40,82 40,13 40,62 40,65 41,06
SEIUTB1 0,31 0,30 0,31 0,32 0,33 0,31 0,30 0,31 0,28 0,29 0,26 0,27 0,28 0,28 0,27 0,25
SEIUTB2 0,35 0,37 0,37 0,34 0,33 0,33 0,34 0,36 0,34 0,32 0,32 0,31 0,32 0,31 0,30 0,30
SEIUTB3 0,22 0,20 0,19 0,21 0,21 0,21 0,22 0,22 0,22 0,26 0,26 0,25 0,25 0,25 0,26 0,26
SEIUTB4 0,13 0,12 0,13 0,13 0,13 0,14 0,14 0,11 0,16 0,13 0,16 0,17 0,15 0,16 0,17 0,20
SEIARB 0,52 0,55 0,57 0,53 0,54 0,53 0,53 0,57 0,52 0,50 0,48 0,49 0,49 0,47 0,47 0,45
SEITJM 0,48 0,45 0,43 0,47 0,46 0,47 0,47 0,43 0,48 0,50 0,52 0,51 0,51 0,53 0,53 0,55
NGR23 0,37 0,35 0,38 0,39 0,37 0,35 0,34 0,35 0,33 0,32 0,31 0,32 0,33 0,31 0,33 0,32
NGR4 0,02 0,02 0,01 0,01 0,02 0,02 0,02 0,01 0,02 0,02 0,01 0,01 0,01 0,01 0,01 0,01
NGR5 0,10 0,12 0,11 0,10 0,10 0,11 0,12 0,12 0,12 0,12 0,12 0,12 0,10 0,12 0,10 0,10
NGR6 0,11 0,13 0,11 0,10 0,11 0,11 0,12 0,12 0,12 0,11 0,14 0,12 0,14 0,13 0,14 0,15
NGR7 0,12 0,10 0,10 0,09 0,12 0,12 0,11 0,10 0,10 0,11 0,09 0,09 0,08 0,10 0,09 0,10
NGR8 0,07 0,06 0,07 0,07 0,07 0,09 0,08 0,07 0,09 0,09 0,11 0,11 0,13 0,12 0,12 0,13
NGR9 0,09 0,10 0,10 0,09 0,09 0,09 0,10 0,09 0,08 0,09 0,09 0,09 0,07 0,07 0,07 0,06
NGR93 0,12 0,12 0,12 0,14 0,11 0,11 0,13 0,12 0,13 0,13 0,13 0,14 0,14 0,14 0,14 0,14
REGSTH 0,19 0,18 0,19 0,19 0,17 0,18 0,18 0,18 0,19 0,19 0,21 0,19 0,21 0,20 0,16 0,19
REGGBGM 0,16 0,14 0,15 0,14 0,17 0,16 0,16 0,16 0,15 0,15 0,14 0,14 0,15 0,14 0,14 0,15
REG90 0,33 0,31 0,32 0,31 0,32 0,32 0,34 0,32 0,36 0,37 0,36 0,37 0,37 0,37 0,41 0,39
REGS2790 0,20 0,22 0,22 0,22 0,21 0,20 0,20 0,21 0,19 0,18 0,19 0,19 0,18 0,20 0,19 0,17
REGN2790 0,07 0,08 0,07 0,08 0,08 0,07 0,08 0,08 0,05 0,06 0,06 0,06 0,05 0,05 0,06 0,06
REGNGL 0,05 0,07 0,05 0,06 0,06 0,05 0,05 0,05 0,05 0,05 0,04 0,05 0,04 0,04 0,05 0,05
YRKST1 0,13 0,16 0,14 0,13 0,13 0,13 0,11 0,09 0,10 0,12 0,11 0,08 0,07 0,07 0,08 0,06
YRKST2 0,13 0,13 0,15 0,17 0,15 0,14 0,15 0,14 0,14 0,14 0,12 0,14 0,12 0,13 0,12 0,11
YRKST3 0,74 0,71 0,72 0,71 0,73 0,73 0,73 0,76 0,76 0,74 0,77 0,78 0,82 0,80 0,81 0,83
FODSV 0,95 0,95 0,96 0,96 0,97 0,96 0,96 0,95 0,95 0,96 0,97 0,97 0,97 0,97 0,97 0,97
FNORDEN 0,03 0,03 0,03 0,02 0,02 0,02 0,02 0,02 0,02 0,02 0,02 0,01 0,02 0,01 0,01 0,01
FOVARLD 0,02 0,01 0,02 0,01 0,01 0,02 0,02 0,02 0,03 0,02 0,02 0,01 0,02 0,02 0,02 0,01
ANDKVIN 0,28 0,27 0,27 0,29 0,27 0,29 0,28 0,28 0,29 0,29 0,30 0,31 0,31 0,30 0,29 0,29
Antal obs 1551 1588 1478 1491 1795 2159 2089 2598 2199 2246 2827 1816 2744 1892 2781 191239
Table A4. Regression results, women, some selected years.
1981 1986 1991 1995 1998
Variables Par. Est st-error Par. Est st-error Par. Est st-error Par. Est st-error Par. est st-error
INTERCEPT 3.300** 0.106 3.568** 0.105 4.290** 0.079 3.732** 0.098 3.993** 0.117
AGE 0.012* 0.005 0.015** 0.005 0.000 0.004 0.026** 0.005 0.021** 0.005
AGE2 * 1000 0.102 0.066 -0.153** 0.059 0.050 0.047 -0.229** 0.056 -0.160* 0.064
SEIUTB1 -0.081** 0.026 -0.024 0.020 -0.074** 0.017 -0.013 0.020 -0.084** 0.022
SEIUTB3 0.067 0.036 0.066** 0.024 0.117** 0.018 0.080** 0.021 0.082** 0.025
SEIUTB4 0.325** 0.049 0.222** 0.030 0.274** 0.030 0.275** 0.030 0.237** 0.032
SEITJM -0.021 0.025 -0.010 0.022 -0.039* 0.017 0.006 0.021 0.013 0.023
NGR4 0.028 0.081 -0.266 0.160 -0.029 0.087 0.101 0.072 -0.165 0.105
NGR5 0.017 0.105 -0.013 0.074 -0.021 0.040 -0.095 0.128 -0.146 0.114
NGR6 -0.052 0.037 -0.096** 0.036 -0.058* 0.025 0.016 0.036 -0.076* 0.034
NGR7 -0.008 0.070 0.059 0.036 0.000 0.039 0.007 0.047 -0.014 0.043
NGR8 -0.037 0.039 0.002 0.037 0.007 0.031 0.000 0.036 -0.039 0.040
NGR9 -0.086 0.049 -0.001 0.043 -0.078* 0.035 -0.012 0.041 -0.096 0.050
NGR93 -0.082 0.048 -0.052 0.038 -0.025 0.032 -0.063 0.036 -0.161** 0.041
REGSTH 0.011 0.029 0.019 0.025 0.078** 0.021 0.062* 0.025 0.092** 0.028
REGGBGMA -0.015 0.038 -0.013 0.028 0.026 0.022 0.074** 0.027 0.098** 0.028
REG90 -0.010 0.027 -0.005 0.022 0.022 0.017 0.019 0.023 0.011 0.023
REGN2790 -0.016 0.037 0.108** 0.039 0.005 0.027 0.006 0.035 0.030 0.035
REGNGL -0.008 0.038 0.006 0.040 0.029 0.028 -0.008 0.032 -0.036 0.040
YRKST1 0.068 0.041 -0.052 0.029 0.000 0.029 -0.033 0.041 -0.066 0.048
YRKST2 0.057 0.037 -0.007 0.031 -0.036 0.026 0.030 0.026 0.019 0.033
FNORDEN 0.109 0.063 0.067 0.058 -0.032 0.048 -0.064 0.049 -0.085 0.054
FOVARLD 0.025 0.058 0.041 0.062 -0.108* 0.048 -0.118* 0.053 -0.071 0.052
ANDKVIN 0.113* 0.051 0.100** 0.036 0.053 0.030 -0.006 0.044 0.000 0.041
N 1944 2088 2309 2822 1929
Adj-R
2 0.1161 0.07522 0.1272 0.1320 0.1772
** Significant at 1%-level. * Significant at 5%-level40
Table A5. Regression results, men, some selected years.
1981 1986 1991 1995 1998
Variables Par. Est st-error Par. Est st-error Par. Est st-error Par. Est st-error Par. est st-error
INTERCEPT 3.237** 0.151 3.519** 0.097 3.914** 0.085 3.865** 0.111 4.050** 0.105
AGE 0.017* 0.007 0.021** 0.005 0.025** 0.004 0.030** 0.005 0.025** 0.005
AGE2 * 1000 -0.142 0.084 -0.201** 0.055 -0.251** 0.053 -0.296** 0.064 -0.226** 0.063
SEIUTB1 -0.046 0.024 -0.033 0.020 -0.068** 0.017 -0.028 0.019 -0.072** 0.021
SEIUTB3 0.064 0.033 0.064* 0.030 0.040 0.028 -0.011 0.028 -0.031 0.032
SEIUTB4 0.351* 0.040 0.314** 0.035 0.311** 0.032 0.253** 0.030 0.228** 0.034
SEITJM 0.113** 0.033 0.104** 0.028 0.082** 0.026 0.147** 0.027 0.138** 0.030
NGR4 0.080 0.066 0.025 0.052 0.058 0.034 0.061 0.037 0.086 0.052
NGR5 0.013 0.036 -0.041 0.026 0.022 0.022 -0.067* 0.027 -0.166** 0.029
NGR6 -0.004 0.028 -0.107** 0.029 -0.037 0.026 -0.051* 0.026 -0.104** 0.026
NGR7 -0.029 0.036 -0.018 0.027 -0.042 0.026 -0.119** 0.027 0.003 0.027
NGR8 0.127** 0.044 0.007 0.033 0.038 0.031 -0.050 0.027 0.024 0.032
NGR9 -0.050 0.041 -0.088** 0.027 -0.063* 0.029 -0.106** 0.034 -0.077 0.050
NGR93 -0.011 0.060 -0.060 0.042 -0.102** 0.031 -0.122** 0.036 -0.167** 0.046
REGSTH 0.089** 0.032 0.142** 0.024 0.088** 0.024 0.091** 0.024 0.125** 0.029
REGGBGMA 0.022 0.029 0.075** 0.023 0.038 0.023 0.064* 0.026 0.114** 0.028
REG90 0.049 0.027 0.064** 0.021 0.017 0.017 0.040 0.021 0.051* 0.021
REGN2790 0.019 0.043 0.078** 0.028 0.035 0.031 0.010 0.040 0.033 0.039
REGNGL -0.004 0.048 -0.014 0.030 -0.005 0.038 0.008 0.033 -0.012 0.039
YRKST1 0.057 0.038 0.019 0.024 0.036 0.022 0.035 0.035 0.057 0.041
YRKST2 0.014 0.054 0.003 0.032 0.030 0.027 -0.080** 0.031 0.000 0.043
FNORDEN 0.005 0.045 0.022 0.073 0.081 0.077 0.019 0.053 -0.118** 0.041
FOVARLD 0.059 0.044 -0.139** 0.042 -0.116 0.059 -0.071 0.080 -0.221** 0.076
ANDKVIN -0.075 0.044 -0.089* 0.037 -0.079* 0.034 -0.065 0.033 -0.112* 0.046
N 1551 1795 2246 2744 1912
Adj-R
2 0.3562 0.3167 0.2446 0.2384 0.2765
** Significant at 1%-level. * Significant at 5%-level